The Phallus and Its Discontents: Castration, Fetishism, and the Limits of Psychoanalytic Theory

Or ... The Fetish of Castration: Freud’s Parapraxis, Lacan’s Phallogocentrism, and the Unconscious Fetishism of Psychoanalysis

Or ... Revisiting How “Reality” Slips into Theory and Binds Psychoanalysis to Phantasy

Sigmund Freud’s reference to the “reality of castration” in the Wolfman case study remains difficult to interpret because it operates on multiple levels—biological, psychological, and symbolic—without a clear resolution as to which level ultimately grounds his analysis. In From the History of an Infantile Neurosis (1918), Freud asserts, “The reality of castration is unassailable” (“Die Realität der Kastration ist unerschütterlich”; GW XII, p. 126; SE 17, p. 91), a claim that is as provocative as it is ambiguous.

On one hand, Freud presents castration as a concrete threat, tied to the Wolfman’s childhood fears and his phantasies surrounding the primal scene. On the other, he frames it as a necessary structural function within the development of subjectivity, particularly through the Oedipus complex and the establishment of sexual difference. This duality is not simply a theoretical tension; it highlights a persistent slippage in Freud’s work between empirical observation and theoretical construction, between historical reality and the psychical reality shaped by unconscious phantasy.

The ambiguity deepens when one considers Freud’s vacillation between historical reality—whether the Wolfman actually witnessed his parents engaging in intercourse a tergo at the age of one and a half—and the psychical reality produced through Nachträglichkeit (deferred action). Freud maintains that the Wolfman’s neurosis stems from his later retroactive understanding of the scene, yet his assertion of the “reality of castration” suggests something more than a contingent interpretation of an early childhood experience. It implies a necessity that transcends individual history, binding psychoanalysis to castration as an unavoidable conceptual foundation. The refusal—or perhaps inability—to fully disentangle castration as a literal event from its symbolic function exposes a fundamental tension in Freud’s method: his reliance on retrospective reconstruction, and the blurred distinction between historical truth and the unconscious production of meaning.

At a broader level, this tension reflects the epistemological paradoxes within psychoanalysis itself. Freud’s clinical writings meticulously—though at times inconsistently—trace how children construct infantile sexual theories, often centered on the belief that the mother is “castrated,” and how these early interpretations profoundly shape the adult psyche.

However, there are moments when Freud seems to treat the child’s phantasy of maternal castration as if it were an objective fact rather than a constructed belief, slipping into a kind of unconscious fetishism regarding the centrality of castration in psychoanalytic thought. This is particularly ironic given that Freud’s own theory of disavowal underpins his concept of fetishism—the psychic mechanism by which the subject simultaneously recognizes and denies castration. If, as Freud argues, fetishism serves as a compromise formation that both affirms and negates an unbearable truth, then psychoanalysis itself risks falling into a similar dynamic: acknowledging the symbolic nature of castration while nevertheless treating it as an inescapable reality. In this way, the very structure of psychoanalytic theory may unwittingly reproduce the fetishistic disavowal that Freud so carefully attributes to his patients.

This slippage raises a critical question: does Freud analyze the castration complex merely as a structuring feature of subjectivity, or does he inadvertently reinscribe it as an unavoidable truth, naturalizing what is ultimately a symbolic construct? Here, one might detect a kind of parapraxis at work—not in the speech of Freud’s patients, but in the very foundation of his own theoretical framework.

Jacques Lacan would later take up this problem, universalizing the notion of castration and deepening its structural role within psychoanalysis. For Lacan, lack is not just one feature of subjectivity; it is the very hinge upon which all subjectivity turns, with castration constituting the fundamental rupture that initiates entry into the symbolic order. Yet, as Jacques Derrida has observed, such a position risks turning castration into a transcendental signifier—an organizing absence that, paradoxically, mirrors the presence-based metaphysics that Western philosophy has long sought to ground.

In this sense, psychoanalysis risks becoming what Derrida terms a phallogocentric discourse, wherein castration functions as the transcendental signifier of lack, while the phallus assumes the role of a transcendental presence—both acquiring a quasi-metaphysical status. Instead of remaining contingent, historically situated constructs within the symbolic order, castration and the phallus are elevated to foundational principles, structuring subjectivity in a way that mirrors the logocentric assumptions psychoanalysis ostensibly critiques. In this way, psychoanalysis risks reaffirming the very metaphysical binaries—presence/absence, fullness/lack—that it aims to deconstruct, treating them not as contingent effects of discourse and unconscious phantasy but as foundational truths.

This slippage—wherein castration is elevated from a psychoanalytic concept to an absolute necessity—raises the possibility that Freud’s 1918 insistence on the “reality of castration” may itself function as a fetish within psychoanalysis in general, one that betrays the very logic of disavowal that Freud so often attributes to his patients. If the fetish, as Freud defines it, is both a recognition and a denial of castration, then might we not say that psychoanalysis, in its own way, both acknowledges the constructed nature of castration and yet clings to it as an unassailable foundation? In this way, Freud’s own conceptual framework becomes implicated in the very process he describes—bound to phantasy even as it seeks to diagnose its operations.

Freud’s Fetishism and the Parapraxis of “Reality”

Freud’s discussion of fetishism famously appears in works such as Fetishism (1927) and is exemplified in key passages of his major case histories, including From the History of an Infantile Neurosis (1918). However, his most intricate treatment of the psychic mechanism underlying fetishism emerges in his 1938 essay Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defense, where he formalizes the idea that the ego can sustain two mutually incompatible realities simultaneously.

For Freud, fetishism is a paradigmatic instance of this process, operating as a compromise formation that allows the subject—curiously, always presumed to be male in Freud’s framework—to manage the unbearable recognition of maternal castration. Confronted with the perceived absence of the mother’s penis, the (yet again, male) child experiences an intolerable tension: he cannot fully accept that this absence is the universal condition of women, nor can he entirely dismiss the possibility that castration is real and thus a looming threat to his own phallic integrity. To resolve this impasse, the fetish emerges as a psychic crutch, allowing him to both deny and acknowledge castration simultaneously, maintaining a precarious equilibrium between recognition and disavowal.

(Meanwhile, the girl—conspicuously absent from this psychic drama—somehow develops penis envy, as though the mere presence of a fragile, easily wounded organ is synonymous with power and invulnerability. This asymmetry raises serious questions, not only for feminists but for anyone attuned to the implicit biases within Freud’s model of sexual difference.)

To manage this psychic tension, disavowal (Verleugnung) sets in, creating a structural split in the ego: one part categorically denies the mother’s castration, while another part acknowledges it as an inescapable fact. This splitting, rather than achieving a true resolution, enables both contradictory positions to persist in parallel, insulated from one another. The fetish object—be it a shoe, a piece of clothing, or a particular body part—functions as a crucial stabilizing mechanism in this psychic economy. By serving as a substitute for the absent maternal phallus, the fetish allows the subject to maintain a fragile balance between recognition and denial, keeping both positions intact without necessitating full psychic integration.

Freud’s late theorization of ego-splitting in 1938 thus reinforces what was already implicit in his earlier work on fetishism: psychoanalysis must grapple not only with repression but with more complex modes of psychic division, where belief and disbelief, acknowledgment and denial, can coexist within the same subject without one necessarily canceling out the other. This model of disavowal complicates any straightforward reading of Freud’s own theoretical commitments, particularly when it comes to the “reality” of castration itself.

While Freud describes the child's perception of maternal castration as a developmental moment shaped by phantasy, certain passages in his work suggest a slippage in his own language. At times, he appears to treat the child's belief not merely as a psychic construction but as an evidentiary discovery—a moment in which castration is revealed rather than imagined. Ironically, while Freud takes great care to emphasize that the child’s perspective is partial or distorted, his own discourse occasionally affirms the child’s “discovery” as a fundamental milestone of human development. Here, psychoanalysis risks conflating the child’s belief with Freud’s own theoretical presuppositions, producing what might be termed a parapraxis within Freud’s exposition. In effect, his writing betrays an unconscious commitment to castration as more than a clinical construct—an implicit assumption that gives it the status of an objective, almost axiomatic truth.

Freud does not explicitly articulate a theory of the reality of castration, yet his framing often implies one. By subtly reinforcing the child's perspective as though it reveals a literal truth, Freud positions castration as a foundational principle rather than a contingent element within psychic development. This slippage parallels the very fetishistic mechanism he describes in his patients: an object or idea is simultaneously recognized as contingent and elevated to the status of an incontestable fact. In this way, Freud’s own discourse “fetishizes” castration, attributing to it a structuring force that orients the entire psychic world, particularly in the formation of sexual difference. What begins as a clinical observation ultimately risks becoming a metaphysical axiom—one that, like the fetish itself, both conceals and reveals the deeper contradictions at the heart of psychoanalytic thought.

Lacan’s Universalization: Phallogocentrism and the Role of Lack

Jacques Lacan intensifies Freud’s emphasis on castration by reframing it within a broader theory of lack as the fundamental condition of subjectivity. While Freud foregrounds the child’s confrontation with maternal absence as a pivotal moment, Lacan shifts the focus from a developmental drama of the mother’s castration to a structural account of castration as the inescapable loss that constitutes subject formation. For Lacan, castration is not about a literal absence but about the subject's encounter with the impossibility of fullness, wholeness, or self-coincidence—what he calls manque-à-être ("lack of being").

This recognition of lack is what situates the child within the Symbolic order, the realm of language, law, and social structure. Initially, in the Imaginary stage, the child experiences the mère phallique—the fantasy of the mother as an omnipotent figure who can fully gratify the child's needs. The child desires to be the object of the mother’s desire, imagining an exclusive, self-sufficient relationship with her. However, this fantasy is disrupted by the Nom-du-Père (Name-of-the-Father), a function that intervenes to signify that the mother’s desire is not wholly directed toward the child—that she, too, is marked by lack.

This realization—that neither the mother nor the child possesses a self-sufficient, closed circuit of desire—forces the child to recognize that satisfaction is mediated by language and the social order. The phallus, in Lacanian terms, is not something one can possess but a signifier of desire’s fundamental incompleteness—something always pursued but never fully attained. By accepting castration, the child enters the Symbolic, where meaning and subjectivity are structured through signifiers rather than through direct, instinctual fulfillment.

Crucially, the child does not "accept" castration as a conscious decision but because there is no alternative: remaining in the Imaginary, clinging to the fantasy of undivided unity with the mother, would mean foreclosure from language and the Symbolic order itself. The price of subjectivity is the acceptance of lack. However, this lack is not merely a negation but the very condition that makes desire possible. By shifting from Freud’s focus on maternal castration to a broader lack of being, Lacan transforms what was, for Freud, a specific infantile phantasy into the structural principle that governs all subjects.

This universalization, however, has a crucial consequence: it risks transforming castration from a symbolic operation into an ontological truth. While Lacan insists that castration is primarily a function of the Symbolic—a signifier of the gap or structural incompleteness inherent in language—his rhetorical style often frames it as an inescapable reality of human existence. In this slippage, castration begins to take on a quasi-transcendental status, structuring not only desire but subjectivity itself in a way that can appear absolute.

Here, the concept risks becoming phallogocentric: the phallus, representing lack, assumes the role of a master signifier around which language, identity, and meaning revolve. Critics argue that in this formulation, psychoanalysis mirrors the metaphysical structure it ostensibly critiques, setting up a system where “the reality of castration” functions as the absent center of subjectivity. Just as Western philosophy, in Derrida’s critique of logocentrism, privileges a fundamental presence (logos) as the grounding principle of meaning, Lacanian theory can appear to replace this presence with a foundational absence—castration as the structuring lack that establishes the phallus as a kind of transcendental signifier. In doing so, psychoanalysis risks reinscribing a single, totalizing framework in which all subjects are inevitably bound to the logic of castration, even as it claims to expose the contingency of meaning.

Thus, Lacan’s reworking of Freud could be seen as a further fetishization of the Freudian slip—not just as an instance of failed speech but as the master key to subjectivity itself. In Freud’s account, the child’s discovery of maternal castration is a crucial yet contingent moment within development, one that could be analyzed but also historicized. Lacan, however, radicalizes this moment into an all-encompassing structure, making lack the organizing principle of both psychic life and cultural processes. If Freud’s parapraxis was to treat the child’s belief in maternal lack as a formative reality, Lacan’s is to elevate that moment into a metaphysical necessity, where the very conditions of meaning, desire, and knowledge are permanently inscribed by the drama of castration. In this sense, the critique of logocentrism applies just as much to psychoanalysis itself, revealing the ways in which it too can reproduce the kind of absolute structures it claims to dismantle.

Derrida’s Critique: Deconstructing “Castration-Truth”

Jacques Derrida interrogates the metaphysical leanings of psychoanalysis, particularly in its Lacanian phase, where castration risks functioning as a transcendental principle. While Derrida acknowledges Freud’s radical insights into language, the unconscious, and subjectivity’s instability, he argues that psychoanalysis inadvertently clings to a castration-truth—a structuring absence that anchors its entire theory of desire and meaning. In classical metaphysics, logos operates as the ultimate foundation of truth; similarly, in psychoanalysis, castration serves as the final rationale for why subjects experience lack and how meaning circulates.

For Derrida, no signifier—whether presence or absence—can escape the play of différance, the ceaseless process of deferral and differentiation in language. If Freud’s or Lacan’s accounts of castration seem to root meaning and desire in a single, universal structure, then psychoanalysis risks reinstating the very metaphysical tradition it claims to subvert. Phallogocentrism is Derrida’s term for this paradox: psychoanalysis critiques logocentrism, yet retains a privileged signifier—castration—as its hidden anchor. Even as it reveals the constructed nature of phantasies, psychoanalysis upholds castration as an ultimate, inescapable fact, treating lack not merely as a structural effect but as an ontological necessity.

The Unconscious Fetish of Psychoanalysis

If disavowal produces a fetish by sustaining contradictory beliefs, then psychoanalysis itself may be guilty of the very phenomenon it diagnoses in patients. Freud’s slip occurs when he treats the child’s phantasy of maternal castration as though it were a literal discovery, revealing an implicit investment in castration’s centrality. Lacan amplifies this fetishism by formalizing castration as a structural necessity—nominally symbolic yet often sounding as though it describes an inescapable ontological condition. Despite Lacan’s insistence that castration is purely a function of signification, his rhetoric frequently elevates it to the status of a cosmic law governing the human condition.

In both Freud and Lacan, then, castration becomes a theoretical fetish—oscillating between acknowledged phantasy and presumed reality. Their texts at times confess that castration is merely the child’s misconstrual of sexual difference, yet elsewhere treat it as the foundational principle of psychic life. This duality mirrors fetishism itself: simultaneously seeing and not seeing, recognizing and denying, believing and disbelieving.

Phallogocentrism: Castration as the Master Signifier

Derrida’s critique of phallogocentrism highlights how psychoanalysis privileges the phallus—not simply as a signifier among others, but as the signifier that structures all meaning, identity, and difference. Logocentrism seeks a stable center from which meaning emanates, while phallocentrism privileges the phallus as the axis of desire. Conjoined as phallogocentrism, the term describes a discourse that elevates castration to the organizing principle of subjectivity, even while claiming to expose the illusions inherent in such structuring.

Lacan’s references to the Name-of-the-Father, the paternal metaphor, and the phallus as signifier reveal how psychoanalysis positions castration as the unavoidable structuring force of psychic and cultural life. The problem, as Derrida sees it, is that psychoanalysis does not fully step outside this framework to consider alternative models of lack or difference. Instead, it risks universalizing castration as the master key to all unconscious formations—sexual difference, symptom formation, language acquisition, and the structuring of desire itself.

The Slippage: From Clinical Insight to Ontological Status

A common defense of Freud and Lacan is that they do not truly reify castration—they acknowledge its phantasmatic nature. Yet a slippage occurs: even as they describe castration as symbolic, they simultaneously treat it as an inescapable psychic and social reality. In Freud, this manifests in parapraxes where the mother’s “lack” is spoken of as a real discovery rather than a child’s misinterpretation. In Lacan, it appears in the rhetorical insistence that castration is the universal condition of subjectivity, even as he places it within the Symbolic order.

From a deconstructive perspective, this tension can be read as unconscious fetishism within psychoanalysis itself—a stance that both disavows and invests in castration’s authority. Psychoanalysis “knows” that castration is an infantile phantasy, yet it still “believes” in its necessity for structuring desire and meaning. This is precisely the mechanism of fetishistic disavowal: acknowledging a belief as contingent while continuing to treat it as absolute.

Consequences for Psychoanalysis and Beyond

Rather than invalidating psychoanalysis, Derrida’s critique invites a deeper reflexivity within the field. If psychoanalysis is a discourse attuned to the contradictions of subjectivity, then it must also interrogate its own symptomatic attachments. A few possible directions:

• Rethinking the Status of Lack: By recognizing castration as a historically specific way of interpreting sexual difference rather than a universal destiny, psychoanalysis could open itself to alternative frameworks. This would include questioning whether “lack” must always be mapped onto anatomical difference or if other symbolic structures could take precedence in different cultural and historical contexts.

  
  

• Broadening Feminist and Queer Critiques: If psychoanalysis unconsciously universalizes a male-centered perspective on difference, then exposing the fetishistic dimension of castration-truth could strengthen feminist and queer critiques. Rather than discarding psychoanalysis altogether, these perspectives could push it toward a more flexible account of gender, embodiment, and desire—one that does not hinge on the phallic signifier.

  
  

• Enriching Clinical Practice: Therapists working within a psychoanalytic framework might benefit from acknowledging how castration structures the analytic process itself. While the concept of symbolic lack remains a powerful interpretive tool, it need not become the sole explanatory lens for every symptom, relational dynamic, or developmental trajectory. A more pluralistic approach could integrate psychoanalysis with other psychodynamic perspectives, making room for different models of subjectivity.

  
  

• Derridean Deconstruction as an Ally: Instead of positioning deconstruction as an external critique of psychoanalysis, one might see it as an extension of the discipline’s own insights. After all, psychoanalysis itself uncovered the instability of meaning, yet it also succumbed to it. A truly reflexive psychoanalysis would embrace this paradox, using deconstruction to refine its awareness of its own conceptual slippage.

Conclusion

Freud’s unintended references to the reality of castration function as a parapraxis within psychoanalytic theory, revealing an unacknowledged ideological investment in castration as more than just an infantile phantasy. Lacan extends this slippage, elevating castration to a universal structural principle. In doing so, both thinkers risk turning castration-truth into what Derrida terms phallogocentrism—a transcendental signifier that organizes the entire discourse of psychoanalysis. This paradox amounts to an unconscious fetishism of castration: psychoanalysis, the discipline that seeks to expose illusions, becomes attached to a central illusion of its own.

Recognizing this dynamic does not diminish the significance of Freud’s and Lacan’s contributions. On the contrary, it reveals the vitality of a theory that can interpret its own symptomatic tendencies. By attending to its own conceptual parapraxes, psychoanalysis can refine its understanding of how fantasy and reality, presence and absence, remain entwined—not only in the psyche but in the theories that attempt to explain it. A psychoanalysis that fully embraces this insight could become more attuned to its own internal contradictions, using them not as limitations but as starting points for further inquiry.