Saul Bellow's Seize the Day and Buddhism's Lack of a Mitsein Ontology of Care: Relational Disintegration and Horney's Moral Masochism

In my 1994 master's thesis, Self and Suffering in Saul Bellow's Seize the Day: A Horneyan Interpretation of the Protagonist, I argued that Karen Horney’s theory of moral masochism and Freud’s concept of the "oceanic feeling" illuminate the profound relational and existential crises that arise when the self loses its grounding in meaningful connections to others. These frameworks reveal how unresolved tensions between autonomy and the longing for connection can lead to the disintegration of the self. In Seize the Day, Wilhelm serves as a striking example of this dynamic, embodying the collapse of identity as he struggles to reconcile his fragmented relational and individual selves in a world recently fractured by the horrors of the Holocaust. Together, these ideas point to the necessity of a relational ontology—one that places care and relationality at the very core of human existence.

I focus on the Holocaust and Bellow's novella in my post on Wilhelm as a "post-Holocaust Everyman." Here, I focus on Horney’s moral masochism and how it provides a lens through which to understand the self’s collapse as a result of unresolved relational dynamics. Moral masochism arises when individuals internalize conflict between their fragmented sense of self and their idealized self-image, seeking validation through suffering or submission to external forces. In Wilhelm’s case, his fractured relationships with his father, his wife, and the manipulative Dr. Tamkin demonstrate his desperate search for coherence in a relational world that constantly denies him recognition.

This self-destructive dynamic is not simply a personal failing but reflects what Heidegger’s Mitsein (being-with) identifies as the foundational role of relationality in human identity. The failure of Mitsein is central to Wilhelm’s crisis, where the absence of authentic relational care exacerbates his sense of alienation.

Moral Masochism and the Oceanic Feeling

Horney’s theory of moral masochism connects deeply with both Buddhism and Freud’s "oceanic feeling." Freud's oceanic feeling describes the pre-egoic sense of unity that infants experience in an early attachment to the mother. For Freud, this boundless oneness is disrupted as the child becomes aware of its separateness, leaving a residual longing for unity that often manifests throughout adult life. Horney’s moral masochism reflects a distorted attempt to recapture this primal connection by submitting to external forces, even at great personal cost.

Wilhelm’s moral masochism is marked by his yearning to dissolve his fragmented self into relationships that promise, but ultimately fail, to restore coherence: an uncanny return to a primal fantasy of liquid "coherence" that dissolves whatever structures of self had existed before. His desperate attempts to gain his father’s approval or his misplaced trust in Dr. Tamkin mimic the regressive pull of the oceanic feeling, where the self seeks a return to undifferentiated unity. Characters like Wilhelm often represent individuals who cannot reconcile their longing for relational connection with the autonomy required for self-coherence. Instead, their attempts to escape fragmentation deepen their existential disintegration, illustrating how relational failure shapes the collapse of the self.

Relational Disintegration in Seize the Day

Wilhelm’s struggles in Seize the Day exemplify how relational failure leads to the breakdown of identity. His father, Dr. Adler, offers neither care nor recognition, dismissing Wilhelm’s vulnerabilities with cold judgment. Similarly, Wilhelm’s estranged relationship with his wife and his misplaced reliance on Dr. Tamkin reveal his compulsive need for connection, even as these relationships exacerbate his sense of inadequacy. I read Seize the Day as exploring a character who embodies existential disintegration as his relational grounding was lost or disrupted.

Horney’s moral masochism and Freud’s oceanic feeling converge to frame Wilhelm’s plight as a relational crisis. His self-destructive behaviors are not arbitrary but reflect the profound impact of failed Mitsein. Heidegger’s notion of being-with asserts that relationality is not peripheral but foundational to existence. Without the grounding of relational care, Wilhelm becomes trapped in a cycle of dependency and self-sabotage, mirroring the dynamics of moral masochism. This relational failure underscores the existential stakes of care and the need for frameworks that center relationality as essential to human identity.

Toward a Relational Ontology of Care: A Critique of Buddhism’s Relational Framework

The concepts of Karen Horney’s moral masochism, Freud’s "oceanic feeling," and Heidegger’s Mitsein (being-with) converge to highlight the centrality of relationality in human identity and flourishing. Together, these frameworks emphasize that care is not merely an ethical practice but an existential structure tied to the fundamental condition of being-with-others. By focusing on the lived realities of relational care, they provide a lens to critique the ways in which Buddhist philosophy conceptualizes relationality, interdependence (pratītyasamutpāda), and compassion (karuṇā).

Buddhism’s emphasis on detachment from ego and craving often frames relational suffering as a consequence of attachment, focusing on the transcendence of such attachments rather than their intrinsic role in forming identity. While the principle of interdependence recognizes the interconnectedness of all phenomena, its application in Buddhist thought can risk abstracting relationality into a metaphysical concept. This approach contrasts with Mitsein, which situates relationality as a constitutive feature of existence, one that shapes and sustains human identity through embodied engagement and mutual care.

Relationality and Embodiment

Horney and Freud further deepen the focus on relationality by exploring how early attachment experiences fundamentally shape the self. Freud’s "oceanic feeling," rooted in the pre-egoic bond between mother and child, represents an early sense of oneness that is later disrupted by the recognition of separateness. Horney’s moral masochism reflects how the unresolved longing for connection can manifest in self-destructive patterns, as individuals attempt to reconcile their fragmented sense of self through relational dependence. These frameworks underscore that relationality is not an abstract principle but a lived, embodied reality.

In contrast, Buddhism often approaches the body as a site of impermanence and suffering, emphasizing its transcendence through meditative or ethical practices. This view risks neglecting the body’s role as a medium for relational care and engagement.

The focus on embodiment in Horney’s and Heidegger’s work critiques this abstraction, highlighting how the body facilitates the mutual vulnerability and dependency necessary for meaningful connection. Without this grounding, the relational aspects of care can become secondary to the pursuit of individual liberation.

While neither Karen Horney nor Martin Heidegger explicitly centers embodiment in the way contemporary phenomenology or feminist theory might, both engage with themes that implicitly tie the body to relationality and human existence. Horney’s focus is primarily on relational dynamics and their impact on the psyche, but her theories often engage with the embodied aspects of human experience, albeit indirectly:

Moral Masochism and Suffering: In her exploration of moral masochism, Horney delves into how individuals derive psychological meaning from self-inflicted suffering. This suffering often has a physical dimension—manifesting as exhaustion, physical strain, or even neglect of the body—as a neurotic means of seeking relational validation or atonement. While Horney does not explicitly theorize the body, the physicality of suffering in moral masochism underscores how the body becomes a site where psychological and relational conflicts are enacted.
Neurotic Needs and Embodied Tensions: Horney’s concept of neurotic needs highlights how unresolved relational tensions manifest in behaviors that are often embodied. For example, the need for affection and approval can lead to patterns of physical submission or exhaustion, as individuals overextend themselves to meet perceived relational demands. These embodied behaviors point to the inseparability of psychological distress and its physical expressions.
Vulnerability and Dependency: Horney's emphasis on human vulnerability in relational contexts—especially the need for care and validation—suggests that the body, as a site of dependency and need, plays a critical role in relational dynamics. The embodied nature of this vulnerability becomes especially evident in early relational experiences, where physical dependency on caregivers shapes emotional and psychological development.

Heidegger does not focus on the body in isolation but situates embodiment within his broader existential framework, particularly through Dasein (being-there) and Mitsein (being-with):

Being-in-the-World as Embodied Existence: Heidegger’s concept of Dasein inherently involves embodiment, as being-in-the-world requires physical engagement with the world. For instance, tools and equipment gain meaning only through their use, which presupposes a body capable of interaction. The act of using a hammer, walking through a forest, or engaging with another person is always an embodied act, even if Heidegger does not explicitly foreground the body.
Vulnerability in Mitsein: Heidegger’s Mitsein—the notion that Dasein is always being-with-others—implies embodied relationality. Relationships are not abstract but lived and enacted through physical presence and interaction. For example, care (Sorge) involves both emotional and physical engagement with others, as seen in how we assist, comfort, or attend to another person’s needs.
Anxiety and the Body as a Site of Disclosure: In Being and Time, Heidegger discusses how anxiety reveals the groundlessness of existence and confronts Dasein with its finitude. This existential anxiety is often felt physically—through restlessness, discomfort, or other somatic experiences—highlighting the body as a site where existential realities are disclosed.
Death and Embodiment: Heidegger’s analysis of being-toward-death is another implicit engagement with embodiment. The anticipation of death is not an abstract concept but a deeply embodied reality (aging) that shapes how Dasein relates to its own temporality and finitude. The body’s vulnerability to decay and cessation anchors this existential reflection.

While Horney and Heidegger do not explicitly theorize embodiment in the way that phenomenologists like Maurice Merleau-Ponty or psychoanalysts like Donald Winnicott might, their work can be interpreted as engaging with the embodied dimensions of human existence. Horney’s focus on suffering, vulnerability, and relational dynamics often implicates the body as a site where psychological conflicts are enacted. Heidegger’s existential framework embeds embodiment within his discussions of Dasein, Mitsein, and being-toward-death, emphasizing how human existence is always physically situated in the world and with others. Both thinkers thus provide valuable starting points for considering the embodied nature of human connection and care.

Compassion and Relational Care

Compassion (karuṇā) is central to Buddhist ethics, yet its framing as a practice to alleviate suffering can overlook the reciprocal, relational dynamics that Horney, Freud, and Heidegger identify as foundational to care. Compassion in Buddhism is often presented as a one-directional offering, with the emphasis on reducing attachment to the ego and the self. While this approach has its strengths, it contrasts with a relational ontology that emphasizes mutuality and the shared vulnerabilities that create and sustain care.

Heidegger’s Mitsein and Horney’s insights into relational dynamics suggest that care arises not only as a response to suffering but as an ongoing engagement with the complexities of being-with-others. Relational care, in this sense, is not a tool for transcending the ego but an existential mode of connection that acknowledges dependency as integral to human existence. This relational perspective critiques the abstraction of compassion into an ethical practice divorced from the embodied realities of care.

Relational Disintegration and Buddhist Abstraction

Wilhelm’s struggles in Seize the Day illustrate the existential consequences of relational disintegration, where the absence of meaningful relational grounding leads to the collapse of the self. His moral masochism, rooted in his unresolved longing for recognition and care, mirrors the dynamics described by Horney and Freud. This longing cannot be dismissed as mere attachment but reflects a fundamental need for relational engagement. Heidegger’s Mitsein provides a framework for understanding how these relational failures destabilize identity at the very foundation of existence, emphasizing the central role of being-with-others in sustaining the self.

Buddhism’s focus on transcending attachment risks abstracting relational suffering into individual pathology, overlooking the existential dimensions of relational care. While interdependence and compassion are key elements of Buddhist thought, their framing can neglect the material and embodied realities that Freud, Horney, and Heidegger emphasize. This abstraction contrasts sharply with the lived, relational struggles seen in Wilhelm’s disintegration, which highlight the need for a grounding in embodied, mutual care.

Conclusion: The Necessity of Relational Grounding

The intersection of Horney’s moral masochism, Freud’s "oceanic feeling," and Heidegger’s Mitsein critiques the limitations of Buddhist approaches to relationality and care. While Buddhism provides profound insights into interdependence and impermanence, its emphasis on detachment and transcendence can abstract relationality away from the embodied and existential realities that shape human identity. The frameworks offered by Horney, Freud, and Heidegger suggest that relational care is not merely a response to suffering but a constitutive aspect of existence, one that is deeply tied to the embodied condition of being-with-others.

This critique highlights the importance of grounding relational care in the lived realities of mutual vulnerability and dependency, challenging any abstraction that separates care from the dynamics of human connection. By engaging with these relational dimensions, one can better understand the existential stakes of care and the ways in which relational failures contribute to the disintegration of the self. In this sense, a relational ontology of care provides a necessary counterpoint to the abstraction of relationality in Buddhist philosophy, offering a more grounded approach to understanding and addressing the complexities of human existence.