My Ethics of (Cyborgian) Care as Levinasian Ontology? No, but ...

Levinas and Derrida fundamentally reshape our understanding of ontology by bringing ethics to the forefront. Levinas’s insistence on the primacy of the Other challenges traditional notions of Being, while Derrida’s deconstruction of the metaphysics of presence reveals how ontology has historically suppressed difference by denying the trace—an erasure that underpins the illusion of self-sufficient meaning. Together, their work opens new ways of thinking about responsibility, difference, and ethical engagement beyond conventional ontological frameworks. This post explores some key ideas in their work, highlighting how they transform the very foundations of what we call “ontology.”

1. Levinas’s Critique of Ontology

Levinas is often interpreted as critiquing “ontology”—at least in the sense used by Heidegger and other traditional metaphysicians. In Totality and Infinity and later works, Levinas argues that if we take ontology (the study or priority of Being) as “first philosophy,” then we risk subsuming the Other under conceptual frameworks that neutralize its radical alterity. In other words, ontology as traditionally conceived tries to “grasp” or “contain” the Other, thereby missing the ethical encounter.

1. Ethics Before Ontology: For Levinas, ethics—defined as the immediate and uncontainable responsibility one has to another person—precedes or stands outside classical ontological concerns. This is why Levinas is often credited with inverting traditional philosophical priorities: rather than starting with Being, he starts with the face-to-face encounter with the Other.

2. Beyond or Otherwise Than Being: In Otherwise Than Being, Levinas makes it even clearer that the ethical relation transcends or “goes beyond” Being. This is not simply a modification of ontology but a fundamental break from an ontology-centered framework.

Hence, calling your ethics “Levinasian ontology” can be tricky if one wants to remain faithful to Levinas’s strict sense that ethics is prior to, or “otherwise than,” ontology. He is not simply grounding a new ontology in ethics; he is resisting the notion that ethics can be contained within the traditional metaphysics of Being.

2. Derrida on Ontology as Metaphysics

Derrida’s deconstruction similarly calls into question the possibility of a stable or final “ontology”:

1. Ontological Language as Metaphysical: Derrida sees any stable concept of Being, presence, or “absolute foundation” as caught up in the very metaphysical structures that deconstruction aims to unearth. Language, for Derrida, never fully stabilizes around an essence; it always “differs” and defers meaning (différance).

2. Relation to Levinas: Derrida was deeply influenced by Levinas, especially by Levinas’s insistence on the ethical primacy of the Other. At the same time, Derrida warns that any straightforward “foundation” in ethics can slip into metaphysical claims about “what is” if one is not vigilant. If one says, “This is my Levinasian ontology,” Derrida might gently suggest that you are re-ontologizing something Levinas wants kept ethically, not ontologically, grounded.

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3. “Being-With” in Levinas vs. Heidegger

You also mention that Levinas wants to base the foundation of Being (or “ontology”) on “being-with” in an ethical sense. A few clarifications:

• Heidegger’s “Being-with” (Mitsein): In Being and Time, Heidegger uses “being-with” to describe how Dasein (the human way of being) is always already in a social context. This concept is ontological—Heidegger is describing the structure of our existence.

• Levinas’s Alterity and Responsibility: While Levinas certainly centers our “with-ness” to the Other, he does not do so as a straightforward ontological category. Rather, the Other as “the face” resists assimilation into one’s own “being”; it demands a response that is fundamentally ethical, prior to or beyond the question of “what is.”

Therefore, Levinas’s notion of our ethical relation to others is not simply a variant of Heidegger’s “being-with,” because Levinas aims to disrupt the ontological priority of “being-with” by insisting that the Other puts me in question ethically—an experience that cannot be reduced to a shared ontology.

4. Can You Call It Your “Levinasian Ontology”?

• Strictly Speaking, Probably Not: Levinas would caution against framing ethics as an “ontology” because he argues that ethical responsibility precedes and overflows any ontological system.

• Loose or Pragmatic Sense: In casual usage, some people say “Levinasian ontology” when they mean “a worldview informed by Levinas’s emphasis on ethics,” but philosophically, it risks running against Levinas’s own critique of ontological primacy.

If your point is simply that your ethical orientation (cyborgian care) is grounded in Levinas’s ideas about the priority of the Other, you might prefer to say:

“My ethical framework is inspired by Levinas’s prioritization of responsibility to the Other—an ethics that goes beyond (or precedes) traditional ontology.”

This phrasing acknowledges Levinas’s project while avoiding suggesting that he lays down a new ontology in the old metaphysical sense.

5. Bottom Line

1. Levinas and Ontology

   • Levinas is suspicious of traditional ontology because it risks absorbing the Other into a totality of comprehension.

   • He wants to emphasize an ethical relationship that cannot be fully thematized by or subsumed under “Being.”

2. Derrida and Metaphysics

   • Derrida sees any claim to a final ontology or essence as still entangled in metaphysical assumptions.

   • He agrees with Levinas that we must remain vigilant about how language or system-building can mute the otherness of the Other.

3. Recommendation

   • If you want to remain faithful to Levinas, it is often safer to say “my ethical orientation is Levinas-inspired” rather than “my Levinasian ontology.”

   • Levinas is seeking to go “otherwise than being,” not to build a new metaphysical foundation of Being in an ethical manner.

In summary, Levinas does not simply base “Being” on ethics; he is trying to show that ethics is prior to or beyond ontology. Referring to that ethics as an “ontology” (even if done loosely) risks blurring precisely the boundary Levinas wants to maintain. If you want to underscore your stance that care is ethically foundational, it is more aligned with Levinas to say that this care stands “outside” or “before” classical ontology, rather than labeling it “my Levinasian ontology.”