A Critique of Robert Stolorow’s Intersubjectivity Theory

Robert Stolorow’s theory of intersubjectivity, rooted in phenomenological and psychoanalytic traditions, offers a significant departure from classical Freudian models by emphasizing the relational field as the primary context for psychological development and experience. However, Stolorow's framework has been subject to criticism, notably by Jon Mills and others, for its limitations in addressing the nature of the subject as distinct from the intersubjective field. Below, I develop these critiques and elaborate on my central contention: psychological health enables relationality, whereas Stolorow presupposes that relationality is always already given.

1. Theoretical Overreach: Assumptions of Relational Primacy

Stolorow’s intersubjectivity theory posits that human existence is fundamentally relational and embedded in what he terms the "intersubjective field." While this emphasis on relationality has enriched psychoanalytic discourse, it risks conflating the conditions of possibility for relationality with relationality itself. By assuming that individuals are always already relating, Stolorow arguably bypasses the foundational question: what allows for the capacity to relate in the first place?

From this perspective, psychological health becomes the prerequisite for authentic relationality. When Stolorow presupposes that the intersubjective field is the starting point, he undermines the necessity of theorizing the subject as an entity that might be unable or unwilling to relate. In clinical terms, individuals with significant psychopathologies—such as severe narcissism or psychosis—demonstrate that relationality is neither guaranteed nor innate but contingent upon a degree of psychological integration that Stolorow does not adequately theorize.

2. Critique of the "Intersubjective Field": A Misreading of Lacan and Žižek

Stolorow’s intersubjective field appears to echo Lacan’s symbolic order, understood as the realm of language, norms, and shared meaning. However, this resemblance is superficial and conceptually misleading. Lacan’s symbolic is not inherently relational in the phenomenological sense Stolorow assumes; rather, it is a structure that subjects enter into, often in conflict or tension. Žižek further critiques this order as inherently fraught, highlighting the constitutive gaps and antagonisms that define subjectivity.

By framing the intersubjective field as the locus of meaning-making, Stolorow seems to conflate it with Lacan's symbolic order but misses the critical insights Lacan and Žižek offer regarding the non-relational aspects of subjectivity. For Lacan, the subject is split—a divided self caught between the imaginary and symbolic—while Stolorow’s model risks an overly harmonious vision that downplays such internal fractures. Furthermore, Žižek’s emphasis on the Real—the unassimilable kernel of subjective experience that resists symbolization—suggests that Stolorow neglects a vital dimension of psychic life: the subject as radically alone in certain aspects of its being.

3. Failure to Theorize the Isolated Subject

A major criticism of Stolorow’s theory is his failure to theorize the subject in isolation. By privileging relationality, Stolorow inadvertently sidelines the subject’s capacity to exist apart from the intersubjective field. While it is true that much of human experience unfolds in relation to others, the subject's capacity for solitude, self-reflection, and non-relational being is no less crucial to psychological health.

For instance, individuals recovering from trauma often oscillate between relational engagement and necessary withdrawal. The ability to regulate one’s inner world independently of others is an essential marker of psychological health, and yet Stolorow’s framework leaves little room for such autonomous functioning. His intersubjective field becomes a theoretical totality, effectively eclipsing the individual subject as a locus of agency and selfhood.

4. Jon Mills’ Criticism: The Erasure of the Intrapsychic

Jon Mills has critiqued Stolorow for overemphasizing the intersubjective at the expense of the intrapsychic. Mills argues that Stolorow’s theory neglects the internal psychic structures that underpin relationality, including unconscious fantasy, drives, and the dynamics of the internal object world. Mills contends that Stolorow's phenomenological orientation dismisses the Freudian insights into the subject’s inner world as overly individualistic, but this dismissal comes at a cost: the loss of a nuanced account of psychic life that is not reducible to relational dynamics.

Mills' critique aligns with my concern that Stolorow assumes relationality as a given rather than as an achievement. By failing to theorize the conditions under which relationality becomes possible, Stolorow effectively marginalizes the subject’s capacity for transformation through processes that are not inherently intersubjective, such as mourning, introspection, or sublimation.

5. Psychological Health as a Prerequisite for Relating

At its core, Stolorow’s theory fails to address the role of psychological health as a precondition for relationality. Relating to others requires a degree of internal cohesion, emotional regulation, and capacity for symbolic representation that Stolorow appears to take for granted. In cases of profound psychological distress, individuals often experience a breakdown in relationality precisely because these prerequisites are compromised.

This critique aligns with Lacan’s view that the subject’s entry into the symbolic order is fraught with difficulty and never fully resolved. It also resonates with Freud’s insistence on the importance of working through internal conflicts as a precursor to genuine relational engagement. Stolorow’s emphasis on the intersubjective field, while valuable, overlooks the developmental and intrapsychic work necessary for the subject to enter and sustain relationships meaningfully.

Conclusion

Robert Stolorow’s intersubjectivity theory has undoubtedly enriched psychoanalytic theory by emphasizing the relational dimensions of human existence. However, his framework is limited by its presumption that relationality is always already present, an assumption that obscures the critical role of psychological health in enabling the capacity to relate. By conflating the intersubjective field with Lacan’s symbolic order and neglecting the isolated subject and the intrapsychic dimensions of psychic life, Stolorow offers an incomplete account of subjectivity. Relationality, as both Mills and Lacan suggest, is not a given but an achievement—one that presupposes a degree of psychological health and internal integration that Stolorow’s model does not fully theorize.